




Development, Remittances and Migration in Africa. How to reconcile different policy agendas

Marco Zupi, CeSPI

**Exploring African migrations and development policies
prospects over the next 20 years**

La Habana

Palacio de Convenciones, 7 de Febrero de 2007

A faint, light blue world map is visible in the background of the slide, centered behind the text.

Poverty and Development in Africa

Regional Differences in Africa

Demographic Changes and Migration in Africa

Migration and Development in Africa

From Conflicting Theories to Missing Policies

Lessons from a wide consultation among African and European experts (CeSPI-SID, 2006)


The map of Africa




Poverty and Development in Africa

- ◆ Most of African people live in rural areas (41 % of population live in urban areas; 35 % in SSA)
- ◆ Agriculture is still a relevant part of GNI: on average it is 25.5 % (compared to 3 % of OECD)
- ◆ Agricultural income is relatively low compared to urban income
- ◆ Thus urbanization and migration are two main options: by 15 years the number of urbanized people will double and migration will increase
- ◆ As a consequence, environmental degradation is increasing



Africa According to the Global Hunger Index (IFPRI, 2006)



Maps of Sahel vulnerability: from now





To some hotspots based on demographic density, market access, agriculture adaptability, sensitiveness to neighborhood countries changes




Urban-bias dependence (brown), traditional migration with resources (yellow), low density (pink), political vulnerability (red), trade dependency (blue) and unsustainable (green)


World income distribution




Infant mortality and pc GNI: geographical comparisons




Infant mortality and pc GNI: Historical trends




Infant mortality and pc GNI: Heterogeneity within Africa




Infant mortality and pc GNI: Different trends within Africa



Infant mortality and pc GNI: Different quintiles within countries



Regional Development in Africa




ECOWAS: Benin, Burkina Faso, Capo Verde, Costa d'Avorio, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo.

CEMAC: Camerun, Ciad, Gabon, Guinea Equatoriale, Repubblica centroafricana, Repubblica del Congo, Sao Tomè e Principe.


ESA-EPA: Burundi, Comoros, Eritrea, Etiopia, Gibuti, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Repubblica democratica del Congo, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia e Zimbabwe.

SADC-EPA: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambico, Namibia, Swaziland e Tanzania.


Regional Development and Heterogeneity in Africa



Regional Homogeneity in Africa: the Flowers of Development




Regional Homogeneity in Africa: the Flowers of Development




Primary (mono-)products and Trade

	$\geq 50\%$	$\geq 20 \text{ \& } \leq 49\%$	$\geq 10 \text{ \& } \leq 20\%$
Crude oil	Angola, Gabon, Libia, Nigeria, Rep. del Congo	Camerun, Guinea equatoriale	Algeria, Egitto
Gas		Algeria	
Iron		Mauritania	
Copper	Zambia		Repubblica dem. del Congo
Gold		Ghana, Sudafrica	Mali, Zimbabwe
Timber		Guinea equatoriale	Gabon, Ghana, Rep. Centroafricana, Swaziland
Cotton		Benin, Ciad, Mali, Sudan, Togo	Burkina Faso
Tobacco	Malawi	Zimbabwe	
Coffee	Burundi, Etiopia, Uganda	Rwanda	
Cocoa	Sao Tomé e Principe	Costa d'Avorio, Ghana	Camerun, Nigeria
Tea			Kenya, Rwanda
Sugar		Mauritius	Swaziland

The World Price of Cotton




Growth of trade and Poverty Reduction






And what Development, Poverty Reduction and Migration?

World Population Distribution by Region, 1998 and 2050




A Review of the Numbers: Population Growth - Past, Present, and Future




(a) Absolute size


The World Population Map in the past




The World Population Map now




The World Population Map in the future: Europe is the only region projected to decline in population by 2050



Population Pyramids and age structure and dependency burdens (2000)



Population Growth Rates in Developed and Developing Countries, 1950-2000



Eastern Africa: demographic profile

	Population	Growth rate
Burundi	7,5	3,46
Comoros	0,6	2,11
Eritrea	4,4	4,15
Ethiopia	71,3	1,91
Djibouti	0,8	1,84
Kenya	34,3	2,26
Rwanda	9,0	1,61
Seychelles	0,1	0,66
Somalia	8,2	3,26
Sudan	36,2	1,93
Tanzania	38,3	1,88
Uganda	28,9	3,49

Western Africa: demographic profile

	Population	Growth rate
Benin	8,4	3,18
Burkina Faso	31,2	3,17
Cape Verde	0,5	2,34
Cote d'Ivoire	18,2	1,54
Gambia	1,6	2,71
Ghana	22,1	2,09
Guinea	9,4	2,17
Guinea-Bissau	1,6	3,01
Liberia	3,3	0,92
Mali	13,6	2,98
Mauritania	3,0	2,96
Niger	14,0	3,36
Nigeria	131,6	2,19
Senegal	11,7	2,37
Sierra Leon	5,6	3,88
Togo	6,1	2,59

Northern Africa: demographic profile

	Population*	Growth rate**
Algeria	32,9	1,53
Egypt	74,0	1,90
Libya	5,9	1,96
Morocco	30,2	1,91
Tunisia	10,0	0,86

*= millions

**= annual weighted average 2003-2005

Central Africa: demographic profile


	Population	Growth rate
Cameroun	16,3	1,80
Tchad	9,7	3,29
Gabon	1,4	1,57
Equatorial Guinea	0,5	2,28
Central Africa Rep.	4,0	1,27
Congo Rep.	4,0	2,96
Congo Dem. Rep.	57,5	2,95
S. Tome & Principe	0,2	2,32

Southern Africa: demographic profile


	Population	Growth rate
Angola	15,9	2,88
Botswana	1,8	-0,16
Lesotho	1,8	-0,12
Madagascar	18,6	2,71
Malawi	12,9	2,17
Mauritius	1,2	1,05
Mozambique	19,8	1,92
Namibia	2,0	1,15
South Africa	45,2	-0,41
Swaziland	1,1	1,19
Zambia	11,7	1,65
Zimbabwe	13,0	0,57

Fertility in Relation to Income in Developing Countries



Particularly in the ranges of income < \$1,000, fertility rates vary a lot (even though the same per capita income)




Fertility rate and illiteracy rate among women in Africa (1997- 2003)




The relationship between African growth and population between 1961 and 2004




there is no correlation (nor a significant relationship of direct dependence) between growth in per capita product and population growth




Current situation: International Migration is increasing



...and Remittances Even More





Three historical facts

- ◆ Inequality *across* nation-states has become increasingly important in Africa
- ◆ The current wage gaps are enormously higher than in the “age of mass migration”
- ◆ Compared to the first wave of globalization (1870-1920) the difference is labor movements.



Movements of goods are liberalized, movements of capital are liberalized, movements of “professional” services are increasing liberalized (e.g. banking, insurance) including “physical presence”

What is left? liberalization of labor flows

Ideas that block putting labor mobility on the agenda

- ◆ Trade is a substitute for labor mobility
- ◆ Development is about poor *nation-states* not about poor *people*.
- ◆ Poverty is all relative
- ◆ It is politically impossible

Key elements

- ◆ Migration is unique, significant and likely to grow
- ◆ Remittances are the most important source of financing for many African countries
- ◆ Good economic policies and institutions maximize gains for sending and receiving countries and migrants ('Multiple rather than Triple Win')
- ◆ Current immigration policies, largely bilateral, may not stem large undocumented migration
- ◆ Further study and policy experimentation may help overcome the limitations of the existing framework

It is likely that migration from Africa to Europe will increase for six main reasons

- ◆ Differentials in expected quality of life increasing
- ◆ Demand for non-traded services from increasingly affluent and large middle class ('demand needs to be factored into policy')
- ◆ Much lower transportation costs (esp. low cost airlines) and easier to keep in touch
- ◆ Migration is the only quick way to build savings and human capital
- ◆ Demographic decline in Europe (including ECA region) and increase in Africa
- ◆ Current immigration policies, largely bilateral, may not stem large undocumented migration

International market for migrant labor has large benefits...

◆ Sending Countries and Migrants

- Can relieve pressures on labor markets when tight
- Remittances
 - ✎ Migrants remit about 36 percent of their incomes
- Human Capital and Savings
 - ✎ 26 percent intended to start a business on return
 - ✎ 70 percent improved job opportunities

◆ Receiving countries fill labor market shortages and attract new skills

Yet Migration also generates costs

◆ Costs for receiving countries

- New competition: wages may fall as a result of migrants especially for the lower skills
- Strain on existing social services
- Problems with integration of foreign workers
- Criminality


◆ Costs for sending countries

- Loss of human capital, especially if migration permanent
- Disruption to families and communities (may require additional Government services)
- Criminality


◆ Costs for migrants

- Heavy penalty on family life (over half return home due to family related concerns)
- Costs of leaving familiar and adapting to new culture

The Alternative of No International Migration Is to Go Somewhere Else



Estimated and Projected Urban and Rural Population of More and Less Developed Regions, 1950-2030



Income Growth Will Not Keep People at Home

- ◆ As incomes rise, people become more mobile, not less
- ◆ They move out of rural areas and farm jobs
- ◆ ...to cities
- ◆ ...and abroad
- ◆ ***Urbanization (and refugees): crucial role of subnational governments as institutional framework for service delivery***

Trade Integration Will Not Necessarily Reduce Migration

- ◆ Trade integration may reduce out-migration pressures in long run.
- ◆ ...but may intensify pressures in short run
 - Transition, importables to exportables
 - Income growth and mobility
- ◆ Need transition policies.

Human mobility does matter a lot for development...but the changing question

- ◆ **The old question:** “Does migration has a positive or negative effect on development in Africa?”
- ◆ **The new questions:**
 - “Why does international migration seem to promote economic development in some cases and not in others?”
 - “How can policies be designed to influence migration’s impacts in migrant-sending economies?”

International Migration and Development in Africa

- ◆ International migration is neither a panacea nor a threat
- ◆ A complex subject
- ◆ Economic development and underdevelopment shape migration. Migration, in turn, shapes development (issues of remittances and of brain drain)
- ◆ Policy options: the key question is how (local/national/regional/international) governments can support international migration as a development opportunity

Conflicts between ten different theoretical frameworks

1. Neoclassical theory and the importance of expected wage differentials,

2. Historical and post-Marxist school and the idea of inherent cumulative causation process and international commodification of people,

3. Structuralism and the concept of adaptive rationality and hidden momentum of migration,

4. New economics and the importance of intra-family relationships and strategies to insure against risk,

5. Neo-Keynesian school and its emphasis on the market failures and asymmetries,

6. Social network and cultural studies on path dependent phenomena and social chains,


10. Policy framework and new institutional economics focus on the importance of public policies, incentives and institutional changes as main determinants of international migration.

9. Post-Keynesian theory and critical realism focused on effective demand, unemployment and inequality problems hidden by migration flows and,

8. New geography theory and urban studies with particular attention to the informal sector,

7. Dual labour market theory and focus on market imperfections and self-reinforcing segmentation,

But in terms of African policies...



... and EU policies


	Permanent	Temporary
Skilled (selective programs, quota, list of occupations,...)	Cream skimming with “qualification” based visas	Student, “hi tech” and some exceptions (+ EU)
Unskilled	Huh? (- EU)	Gulf States (No family accompaniment)


(and burden-sharing on asylum seekers, protracted refugees situation, post-conflicts, Return home, local integration and resettlement?)

Most legal migration facilitated by bilateral agreements


- ◆ Bilateral migration agreements proliferated rapidly during the early 1990s
- ◆ These agreements form a 'patchwork' as their designs vary tremendously and there is little coordination

Outline of the principal policy agendas





Features of an Alternative Regime for Labor Migration


- 
- ◆ More effectively matches the supply with the demand for international labor
 - ◆ Reduces rents for traffickers
 - ◆ Establishes transparent rules for remuneration, work conditions, and dismissal procedures
 - ◆ Provides incentives for migrants to be complements, not substitutes, to domestic labor
 - ◆ Offers employers means to hire legally the workers they need
 - ◆ Provides incentives to encourage return home where permanent migration is not desired

Lessons from a recent Delphi consultation focused on Africa (CeSPI-SID, 2006)

- focus on future migration trends
- Analysis of policies on brain drain, remittances
- Confirmation of a biaxial pattern (within region, based on some poles, and towards external poles)


Envisaged African mobility over the next twenty years.

Delphi consultation scenarios




Direction of regional flows from Northern Africa: more **professional** to improve income and job opportunities towards Europe from all the countries excepting Libya.

from Eastern Africa
more stress on refugees
movements and different
profiles with a significant
role of return migrations:
ethnic minorities,
professionals, women
and peasants
**(environmental stress
and refugees)**




from Central Africa
**Temporary
movements of
skilled and
unskilled workers**
towards oil
producing and
mining African
countries (mainly of
the same region) and
permanent migration
towards North Africa and
Europe




from Southern Africa
central role of RSA as
destination of
temporary
migrations from
the entire region.

Partially also as a
consequence of
departure of South-
African professionals
towards UK and the
USA



from Western Africa: the more considered region, with two basic push factors: economic (high skilled long-range flows and low-skilled unemployed), and political (new conflicts and return refugees) Transit to North and traditional regional circuits



One option: from Temporary Migration...

- ◆ Temporary nature of migration may have increased remittances
 - Low investment by migrants in host countries
 - High investment in origin
 - Example of human capital investment, effect of remittance on girl education in Egypt
- ◆ In Europe the **unemployment rates** of immigrants is significantly higher than for native-born (difficult integration of immigrants into the labour market)

One option—among many—for improving policies could be to encourage circular migration...


- ◆ Circular migration would/could:
 - Utilize migrants and their acquired skills for economic development in sending country
 - Reduce brain drain because absence is temporary
 - Probably address some fears in receiving countries about migrants staying permanently
 - Provide an alternative to full liberalization for receiving countries

...But...circular migration is a risk


- ◆ Why just a narrow sense of circular migration?
- ◆ It risks to be interpreted as a way to encourage EU to open their frontiers and consider people just as labor force resources
- ◆ Recipient countries tend to search for incentives for people to enter this type of migration, and to return back home when old (pension in the country of origin) or unemployed (subsidies in the country of origin)
- ◆ Or is this measure proposed as a troy horse for liberalizing flows (reducing fear of migration)?
- ◆ What about general welfare Q and quality of services (in Italy INPS pays for maternal, health, disabled... not only pension; in general welfare and social security based on taxes: where do they earn what they pay)?
- ◆ Are other alternatives possible?

Wider and more ambitious option: trans-national territorial partnerships

- In the context of **welfare States dismantling**, remittances provide us a way **to think welfare provision as a trans-national challenge** (combining State and market provisions)
- Main problems are “**cross-border**”: a **right-based approach** based on the recognition of economic citizenship is needed to close the gap between domestic and foreign products and services (whereas banks’ products are country-oriented)
- Need for **innovative approaches** (traditional ones didn’t work: existence of *black market for foreign exchanges* implies that reducing cost is inadequate for attracting migrants)
- A trans-national perspective is a way to think remittances in the context of **trans-national territorial partnerships** (with **mobility** as the core orientation)
- **Multi-level governance**: Is there room for a convergence between migrants interests and local/national and regional (?) governments search for a shared strategy? What about subnational governments?

- 
- Important to overcome the **jurisdiccional gap** (national perspective in policies and instruments vs. transnational phenomenon and interests).
 - To bring together migrants and **four significant actors**: public administrators on a local level, social organisations; a network of financial operators, bankers and non-bankers; and micro-entrepreneurs (Italian experience)
 - **Concrete proposals**: Co-development projects, involving inter-banks agreement, microfinance institutions, ad hoc products and service, guarantee funds, local authorities, immigrants association, NGOs...

Remittances: Source for development?



Human Capital Transfer Risks & Opportunities

Feasibility

Allow dual nationality

Promotion of temporary migration through the development of mechanisms ("double chair")


Effectiveness

Creation of better work conditions in the origin countries to favour the return (permanent or temporary) of expatriated professionals

Increase financial incentives & investments in institutions/ sectors affected by brain drain

Assignment of temporary labour visas after a period of professional activity in the home countries, associated to performance assessment.

Conditions created for more orderly flows of migrants



Themes of policy recommendations

- ◆ **FINANCIAL CAPITAL:** maximize the remittances: transaction costs, leveraging and stable macro-economy, coherence of FfD
- ◆ **HUMAN CAPITAL:** invest in people: is the key to raising productivity, getting non-farm jobs, mobility, creating opportunities at home (internal brain drain)
- ◆ **SOCIAL CAPITAL:** intra-regional circulation, brain circulation, regional integration, Community based development
- ◆ **ENTREPRENURIAL CAPITAL:** individual and associative level in terms of “industrial atmosphere”: innovation, attention to the importance of the transfer of tech and the development of skills acquired in the course of productive activities
- ◆ **INSTITUTIONAL CAPITAL:** Create incentives to invest, An economic and political climate conducive to investing, creation of micro-credit and market infrastructure, extension to help people use markets better and getting into the supply chain (access to market – reducing transaction costs of transportation, information, marketing, contract enforcement – and to inputs, land, new tech), create best insurance and security by diversification

Crucial role of diaspora, decentralized cooperation and co-development, regional integration and support capacity for policy making, implementation, and analysis at all levels (the importance of developing the evidence base for evidence-based policy)


International Migration Is Not the Solution to Poverty

- ◆ The Poorest of the Poor Usually Do Not Migrate Abroad
- ◆ They have the incentives
 - Gap between earnings abroad and at home
- ◆ ...but too many constraints
 - Costs of travel, recruiters/smugglers
 - Risks
- ◆ An income paradox

Networks Drive International Migration


- ◆ “Pioneer” migrants send home not only remittances but also information
 - How to migrate
 - Where to look for work
 - What labor recruiters or smugglers to trust
 - What wages to expect
 - How to overcome migration costs and risks
 - Support for new migrants at their destination.
- ◆ Networks are more important than policy in N. America
- ◆ As the share of households with networks increases, migration costs and risks fall

Internal Migration



- ◆ Rural-to-urban migration was viewed positively until recently
- ◆ The current view is that this migration is greater than the urban areas' abilities to
 - create jobs
 - provide social services


Components of Migration



Remittances Can Help, But It Is Not the Panacea

- ◆ Studies find that remittances are often used for consumption. In any case,
- ◆ Remittances Can Create
 - Liquidity, security for migrant-sending Households (Migrant as insurance policy)
 - Demand for goods and services from other households (if input/output markets work)
 - Liquidity for other households (if capital markets work)

Remittances are crucial in Africa: External Debt,net transfer (US\$ bill.)



pc importance of remittances in Africa

Northern

	GDP	Ext. Debt	Trade Balance	FDI	ODA	Remitt
Algeria	3.112,5	170,5	0,8	26,8	9,7	74,9
Egitto	1.206,7	424,1	32,8	16,9	20,1	45,1
Libia	6.621,1	768,8	1.155,0	34,2	3,1	1,7
Marocco	1.715,2	593,3	12,9	25,5	23,7	139,9
Tunisia	2.862,0	1.965,7	-71,9	59,2	33,0	142,9

ESA-EPA

Burundi	106,0	145,7	-23,8	0,4	48,2	6,6
Comoros	635,9	438,0	-21,0	0,0	41,7	20,0
R. D. Congo	121,2	231,6	-7,8	0,0	32,5	nd
Eritrea	224,0	113,6	-78,5	6,8	61,3	nd
Etiopia	156,8	81,2	-15,1	7,6	26,1	2,9
Gibuti	885,2	542,2	-88,3	41,6	82,3	nd
Kenya	524,8	216,0	-45,0	1,3	19,0	14,4
Madagascar	270,9	161,2	-30,4	2,4	68,2	0,9
Malawi	160,8	201,8	-18,5	1,2	37,8	0,1
Mauritius	5.165,9	7.852,6	-520,8	11,1	30,7	172,3
Rwanda	235,8	143,8	-19,1	0,8	52,6	1,1
Seychelles	8.209,3	5.917,6	-1.941,0	443,2	123,6	11,8
Sudan	764,5	805,9	-150,9	41,7	24,8	28,0
Uganda	302,3	138,8	-14,1	7,7	41,7	23,3
Zambia	622,0	282,8	-26,5	28,6	94,2	nd
Zimbabwe	258,6	407,4	-25,2	4,6	14,4	2,6

pc importance of remittances in Africa

ECOWAS


	GDP	Ext. Debt	Trade Balance	FDI	ODA	Remitt
Benin	508,1	154,0	-43,9	7,1	46,2	6,6
Burkina F.	390,9	136,1	-50,0	2,6	47,6	4,5
Costa Avorio	884,4	655,5	48,2	9,6	8,6	8,2
Capo Verde	2.020,5	1.183,9	-107,1	40,4	282,4	181,5
Gambia	303,9	329,6	-40,7	39,5	42,5	5,3
Ghana	483,7	330,1	-35,9	6,3	62,7	3,7
Guinea	286,0	212,7	-15,4	10,6	30,3	4,5
Guinea-B.	189,8	315,2	-21,0	3,2	49,5	14,5
Liberia	167,0	1.126,9	-1,8	6,1	65,0	nd
Mali	377,1	184,9	-26,3	13,3	43,2	11,4
Mauritania	615,2	423,6	-2,2	97,8	60,3	0,7
Niger	244,0	100,3	-27,7	0,9	39,7	1,8
Nigeria	752,3	76,0	91,1	14,3	4,5	17,3
Senegal	713,5	283,1	-68,3	6,0	92,4	43,8
Sierra Leone	215,8	181,0	-21,3	4,7	67,4	4,5
Togo	358,5	146,5	-50,8	9,8	10,3	24,1

pc importance of remittances in Africa

SADC-EPA

CEMAC

	GDP	Ext. Debt	Trade Balance	FDI	ODA	Remitt
Angola	1.758,8	884,5	376,5	90,6	73,9	nd
Botswana	5.297,9	294,6	962,1	26,5	22,1	22,1
Lesotho	809,5	278,6	-34,0	68,8	56,8	197,8
Mozambico	335,0	141,5	-25,7	12,4	63,2	2,9
Namibia	3.016,0	444,1	277,7	82,2	89,1	7,9
Swaziland	2.414,2	362,5	-67,6	60,5	104,1	78,7
Tanzania	316,0	135,7	-10,3	6,5	46,4	0,3
Camerun	1.040,7	226,7	28,9	0,0	47,5	0,7
Rep. Centr.	339,1	266,0	-14,0	-3,1	26,2	nd
Ciad	561,0	153,9	-48,2	49,0	33,8	nd
Rep. Congo	1.273,0	1.550,4	345,1	0,5	29,9	0,3
Guinea Equ.	6.415,9	198,6	-648,8	3.304,9	60,3	0,3
Gabon	5.821,1	2.818,2	891,7	233,2	27,7	4,3
S.Tome e Pr.	366,5	1.277,8	-160,4	345,0	218,5	6,4
Somalia	165	121,5	nd	1,1	24	nd
Sudafrica	5.314	761,2	-276,9	12,9	13,6	14,6



Brain Drain

- ◆ Can be a *static* cost of international migration
- ◆ Solution: Create incentives to invest in schooling (...certainly not the opposite!)
- ◆ Migration can create incentives to invest in human capital
- ◆ Risk of “internal” brain drain (not only compensations)

“En-Gender” Migration and Development Policies

- ◆ Female share of international migration is nearly one half
- ◆ Migration determinants, policy impacts, remittances, cultural norms, personal security issues, etc., often are different for women than men
- ◆ Networks are gender-specific
- ◆ Gender of those left behind matters
 - Women as agents of migration and development in many cases—so development policy must be gendered